I would like someone to convey my speech to Ms Tabaku, since she is not present, because she spoke with great passion about the protest that has been going on for a hundred and something days, and to tell her that when you are in government and people protest against you, that is called democracy. Whereas you are in opposition and they throw you out of the protest like a contagious disease.
As for my dear Ballist, I have only one thing to say to you. I do not know how I will be remembered in history, but that you Ballists will be remembered as ruthless exterminators of chickens has been sealed for centuries upon centuries.
Now I want to say a few words here, not as one side, but I want to say a few words here as a power, as someone present among a group of elected representatives who represent one of the three independent powers established by the Constitution. And it is unbelievable how representatives of an independent power, simply out of spite towards the other side, surrender their own power so easily to another power. And this is not connected simply and solely with what we are discussing today regarding judges’ salaries. This has to do with the balance of independent powers in a parliamentary republic.
And I want to return to a debate we had here concerning a colleague, Olta Xhaçka, in whose case I have brought with me some words from the Venice Commission, because I believe they are very accurate in guiding our reasoning as representatives, all together, of an independent power: “The competence of the Constitutional Court, as a judicial and not a political body, should not interfere in the sphere of the constitutional legislator, which has the exclusive competence to create new constitutional norms. The boundary between interpreting an existing norm and creating a new norm is not always easy to determine, but the perception of government by judges must be avoided, and the competence to create new constitutional norms belongs to the legislative power, while the Constitutional Court has the competence to interpret the norms authoritatively.”
In very simple words, the Constitutional Court is the referee. It cannot stop the game; it can establish that an infringement has occurred, it can disallow the goal, but it cannot take the ball and say, “The ball is mine; I will take the penalty.”
The Constitutional Court, as another independent power, is independent from us here as the legislative power, and it is independent from us as the executive power, to tell us when we raise our hand wrongly. But if we raise our hand wrongly and the Constitutional Court tells us that, with this raising of the hand, this norm was violated and therefore this norm is struck down, the Constitutional Court can never, under any circumstances and for any reason, tell an independent power such as Parliament how it must raise its hand. That does not happen.
“And now raise your hand for the text that I have written, for the formula that I have chosen and for the amount that I have set” — the Constitutional Court cannot say that to the Parliament of Albania, and there are MPs here who have spent many years in this Parliament.
Today there is one feature, because today there are 84 votes here in the chamber, which are necessary to approve this norm. But if you are not going to be hypocritical, you will have to admit that, if these 84 votes were not here, it would be entirely impossible to achieve a result based on a specific order from another power.
The Constitutional Court can repeal a tax that unconstitutionally discriminates against a category of citizens. The Constitutional Court cannot, however, determine what the tax rate should be. It can strike down a pension provision that infringes equality or legal certainty, but it can never itself draft the pension scheme and determine how much this pensioner or that other pensioner will receive. The Constitutional Court can repeal an unclear criminal provision, but it cannot itself write the new criminal offence and determine the level of punishment.
These are choices that require legislation, public debate, financial assessment and a parliamentary vote. And the case I mentioned leads Venice to remind us that an MP cannot individually be ordered, and Parliament can and must vote on matters that fall within its competence. Now let us come to the salaries of the magistracy, because there is nothing I have not heard here.
First, did the Constitutional Court have the right to review the formula approved by Parliament? Absolutely, yes. To establish a certain incompatibility, according to its assessment? Certainly, yes. To repeal the relevant provisions and require the approval of amendments? Nobody disputes that. But, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court cannot tell legislators how they must resolve the matter within the framework of the norm within which they have to operate. Now, do not think only about today and do not look only at today. This is not an issue of mine or ours at all — zero — for any of the reasons that were mentioned. This is a very simple matter of principle in relation to your children, to the children of all of us. So, I am thinking about tomorrow.
In the year when we carried out the Justice Reform, we undertook to do something that was, in quotation marks, “unfair”. We increased magistrates’ salaries in a stratospheric manner compared with our salary standards and levels, with full willingness and with the reasoning that a fundamental reform of justice, and the need to place a group of motivated magistrates at the barricade of a new justice system, made this necessary. And in this way, we disrupted the salary pyramid.
So, if the salary pyramid is like this, as it is in every country, we raised the judges up here. Now, by what logic do you, or anyone else, demand that every time the salary here increases, the salary up here must increase as well?
According to this logic, it would mean that, for all generations to come, we would build the only republic, the only kingdom, the only empire, the only system that the history of the world has ever seen in which judges stand above everyone else. This is an act of irresponsibility towards the future.
On the other hand, precisely because the legislative power is an independent power, every democratic constitution contains a provision that our Constitution also contains: judges’ salaries cannot be reduced. It is specific. The Constitution does not say that the salary of anyone else cannot be reduced. It says that judges’ salaries cannot be reduced. Why? Because the Constitution, and all democratic constitutions, take into account precisely the tension that arises between the powers for the reasons mentioned here, and for this reason they guarantee that judges and prosecutors can act freely without being threatened by a retaliation — in quotation marks or not in quotation marks — by another political power that could put them under pressure by reducing their salaries.
But are we in a situation where salaries are being reduced?
To say that it is a hidden salary reduction simply because their salaries increase by this much while the others’ salaries increase by this much, while they continue to remain higher, seems unreasonable to me. And here we come to the next point.
To say afterwards that there was a deadline, certainly, I agree with what several people here said, that breaching that deadline entails a certain responsibility for whoever must bear that responsibility, and let us bear it — but to say that on that date another power suddenly came into existence and determined something that, in fact, can only be determined by law, and on the other hand to see an interaction between associations and Albania’s judicial body and to see coordinated movement.
To my knowledge, judges do not even speak to one another before making a decision because they are prohibited from doing so. Even among themselves, within a judicial panel, they discuss, but they do not tell one another how they will ultimately decide.
Meanwhile, seeing this kind of organisation is extremely concerning, and I think that all MPs here, regardless of which side they belong to, should not take this so lightly, because life goes on and all developments in this direction are developments that damage the Republic of Albania. They are not developments that help it.
Naturally, we are not calling into question here the fact that we will respect the decision of the Constitutional Court, as we understand it, and the Constitutional Court leaves this discretion to Parliament. In fact, the Constitutional Court also defines the framework of the options available at this point. But I think that Parliament will send the Constitutional Court a very clear message on this occasion: Your duty is to ensure that we do not raise our hands wrongly, but our duty is to tell you that you can never tell us how to raise our hands. If these two things become confused, we have a very serious problem, which tomorrow could become much bigger. And there is absolutely no kind of challenge here, no kind of fight of any nature with the justice system, no kind of pressure, absolutely nothing of the sort.
Because I will remind you of something else: if we follow through the logic of those who presented this as an attempt to exert pressure, the Special Prosecution Office has not requested salary increases. It has neither requested salary increases nor submitted the payroll other than according to the old formula.
So, this logic falls apart even if, for a moment, we were to take it for granted, which it is not. This is an issue of European state-building. We have entered a new phase. We clearly have a new independent power in this city and, precisely because it is a new independent power, we are seeing things that are unimaginable in a consolidated democracy: investigators going to the Ministry of Finance, prosecutors going to the doors of the Treasury, judges threatening Treasury officials.
So, we are dealing with a body that is enjoying its independence. Is this what we want? Is this what we want? Is this what you want? I do not believe that this is what we want. I believe that we have a responsibility to strengthen this dynamic of the separation of powers, but at the same time we have a responsibility to show where one power ends and where another begins. The Constitution does not speak of two authorities and one independent power. The Constitution speaks of three independent powers. They are mutually independent and mutually intertwined.
And finally, I want to tell you one more thing. On this issue, and here I will have to express myself in an unusual way , I fully agree with the MP from Vlora, as well as with anyone else here who said that there is a need to make a new law, to put an end to this story, which originated at the moment when, during the making of the reform, no timeframe was established for when the pyramid would be rebalanced.
And it was not clearly and plainly stated that: you will receive this now, from Albanian taxpayers, much more than everyone else because the reform requires you to make an extra effort, but this will not be a permanent increase whereby every time everyone else gets an increase, you will get an increase as well.
Because otherwise, as I said at the beginning, we would create the first state in the world — and I challenge everyone to bring me, from at least the last 2,000 years, a system in which judges have stood above everyone else in terms of salaries. It does not happen. It is nonsense.
But, on the other hand, when I speak about the new law, I am not speaking in the abstract. We have begun contacts with the Council of Europe, with the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, and I received all those people whom you had at the relevant committee because they requested a meeting and we organised the meeting.
We organised the meeting according to their wishes and conditions, in the sense of giving everyone the opportunity to speak and to tell them that there is a problem here which we will address together. This cannot turn into a conflict between powers.
Because what would that mean? That tomorrow we should then act as was once done in democratic Albania, when the police were ordered not to execute prosecutors’ decisions? It has happened. We cannot enter into a conflict between powers, and we are ready — not merely ready but fully committed to make a new law.
There are several ways to do it, but this story whereby every time a salary increases in the Republic, a salary over there must also be increased, has to end. This is absurd. And this other thing: “Respect the decision of the Constitutional Court…” Certainly. But a Constitutional Court can never tell a legislator: “Raise your hand like this because I have decided it.” And fortunately, in this case, it has not said that. It has left full discretion.
As regards the breach of the deadline, deadlines are not imposed on Parliament. That is another nonsense. Nobody except its own members can tell Parliament when it will convene and what it will convene for. Here, we spend four hours debating the agenda.
How can another power come out there and say: “You will convene by the 31st, because if you do not convene by the 31st, on the 1st we will storm the doors of the Treasury.” How does that work? And why?
Because two bodies come out there which, in fact, if the Justice Reform gives us many reasons to be encouraged, and to make it clear to all of you, from my point of view I see two successes in the Justice Reform: SPAC and Special Court of First Instance for Corruption and Organized Crime with all their problems, which are two successes — but if there is one failure, it is those two Councils over there.
And if there is one reason for the Parliament of Albania to be concerned, it is precisely to reflect on the Justice Reform, and not on that part of the reform that has become the main leitmotif day after day — “prison, prison” — but on that part of the reform that has become the leitmotif of the lives of those tens of thousands of people who have been turned into files covered in dust.
